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I.

Discrimination in the
Funding of Mass
Transit Systems

Formulating a Title VI
Challenge to the
Subsidization of the
Alameda Contra Costa
Transit District as
Compared to the Bay Area
Rapid Transit District
by Kevin L. Siegel"

Introduction

In metropolitan areas across the United States, public
transportation agencies are massively subsidizing the
improvement and expansion of inter-city rail systems which
largely benefit white commuters from the suburbs.
Meanwhile, transportation agencies are disproportionately
raising fares and are often cutting services on inner-city transit systems which serve mostly minority riderships. The evidence is mounting that the mostly minority, inner-city riders
are paying a greater share of the transit costs than the generally white inter-city riders.
The minority riders have been fighting back, refusing to
allow their inner-city transit systems to take a back seat to
the inter-city systems. In New York City, the regional transportation agency attempted to raise fares disproportionately on the inner-city subway and bus systems as compared to
proposed increases on fares for commuter trains. Minority
riders filed suit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VI") to block the increase, and after a preliminary
injunction was overturned by the Second Circuit, the parties
settled the case. Under the settlement agreement, the
regional transportation agency will provide free transfers
between the bus and subways system and will fund a study
on transportation inequities. In addition, the New York City
and New York State promised to commit funds to the innercity transit systems.
In Los Angeles, the regional transportation agency was
neglecting the needs of bus riders and voting for bus fare
increases while channelling hundreds of millions of dollars
to rail projects. The bus riders sued the transportation
agency, alleging the agency's actions had a discriminatory
impact on racial minorities. As in New York, the parties settled, entering a consent decree which guarantees a variety of
bus passes, the freezing of cash fares, a commitment from
the regional agency to expand and improve bus service, and
the creation of a joint working group by which the plaintiffs
will participate in mass transit decision making.
The discriminatory pattern repeats in the San Francisco
Bay Area. The Alameda Contra Costa Transit District ("AC
Transit"), providing bus transportation to a mostly minority
ridership, has recently increased fares and cut service. In contrast, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District ("BART"), providing
rail transportation to a largely white ridership, is extending
service to several, mostly white, suburbs, although it has also
raised fares in three installments over three years. Both
agencies are affiliated with the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission ("MTC") which provides comprehensive regionG Member, University of California, Hastings College of the Law Class
of 1997. BA Columbia University, 1988. 1 would like to thank so many people in helping me complete this note. First, deep appreciation goes to the
late Ralph Santiago Abascal who helped me shape the paper. Huge thanks
to Thomas A. Rubin who provided financial analysis at the heart of this
inequity. I am also indebted to Richard T.Drury who alerted me to the failure of the system to fairly fund AC Transit. Finally, my greatest thanks go to
my wife Cheryl and daughter Ruby who keep me going.
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al planning and allocates capital and operating subsidies for transportation agencies in the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area.
The purpose of this note is to provide AC Transit
riders interested in ending the discrimination with
factual and legal research that would aid them in
pursuing a Title VI action. To achieve this goal, this
paper reviews Title VI law, examines the New York
and Los Angeles cases and settlements, uncovers the
disproportionate subsidization of BART over AC
Transit, and synthesizes the information in order to
suggest strategies and point out obstacles for plaintiffs interested in filing a Title VI case to remedy the
discrimination suffered by AC Transit riders.

Therefore, while plaintiffs are required to show
purposeful discrimination in a claim under Title VI
itself (as in an Equal Protection claim),7 they need
only show discriminatory effect when suing under
implementing regulations prohibiting disparate
8
racial impact.
The United States Department of Transportation's ("U.S. DOT") Title VI regulations prohibit
entities accepting federal financial assistance from
following practices which have discriminatory
effects on racial minorities. The regulations state:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other benefits, or
facilities which will be provided under any
such program . . . may not, directly or
through contractual or other arrangements,
utilize criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting persons
to discrimination because of their race,
color or national origin.9

II. Title VI
A. The Statute and Implementing Regulations
Title VI prohibits racial discrimination by any
agency which accepts federal funds. Section 2000d
declares that "No person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits cf, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'
Federal administrative agencies have authority
to issue implementing regulations under Title VI2 In
GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Service Commission, the Supreme
Court held valid administrative regulations implementing Title VI which prohibit disparate impact
discrimination. 3 The majority fractured over
whether Title VI itself forbids disparate impact or
only intentional discrimination, but did concur that
implementing regulations could reach disparate
impact discrimination. 4 Both holdings were
affirmed in Alexander v. Choate.5 A different majority in
Guardians concluded that both prospective and retrospective equitable relief are available to plaintiffs,
regardless of whether they prove intentional or dis6
parate impact discrimination.
1.Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601,

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).

2. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d-1 (1994). This section authorizes and

directs each federal agency distributing financial assistance "to
effectuate the provisions .. .by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability." Id.
3. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
593-94 (1983).

4. See id. at 584 n.2.
5. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).

6. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624. 630
n.9 (1984) (court counted O'Connor. Marshall, Stevens, Brennan,

and Blackmun, I.1. as holding in favor of equitable and prospective relief in Guardians). See also Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating
Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-ItShouldn't Be So Easy,

B. The Shifting Burdens of Proof
In a Title VI case, the burden of proof begins
with the plaintiff, shifts to the defendant if the
plaintiff's burden is met, and shifts back to the
plaintiff if the defendant's burden is met. 0 The evidentiary structure has been imported from Title VII
employment discrimination cases. The Supreme
Court has not ruled on the applicability of the Title
VII evidentiary structure for Title VI cases, but the
Federal Courts of Appeals have consistently applied
it.1" The Ninth Circuit expressly adopted and
applied the Title VII standard in the Title VI case
Larry P. v. Riles. 12 Michael Fisher has summarized the
Title VII evidentiary structure, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, as follows:
[I The plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing of disparate impact. [21 The defen58

FORDHAM

L.

REV.

939, 954 (1990).

7. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), infra note
274.
8. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584.
9. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (1996).
10. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (1 th Cir. 1985).
11. See Michael Fisher, Environmentaf Racism Claims Brought
Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 320 (1995). See,
e.g.. Larry P.v. Riles, 793 F2d 969, 982, n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); Georgia
State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d at
1417 (I th Cir. 1985): Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F.
Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

12. See Riles, 793 F.2d at 982, n.9.
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dant can escape liability by demonstrating
the disputed policy has a legitimate purpose-i.e., that it is "significantly related to
some institutional concern at the core of
the enterprise in question." 13] The plaintiff
can still prevail, however, by offering a "less
discriminatory alternative" that would sufficiently serve the defendant's legitimate
interests.13
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Supreme Court had ruled that, in the second stage,
the defendants in a Title VII case needed only to
show a legitimate business necessity, 14 while in the
third stage, the plaintiffs had the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that alternatives "'without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interestlsl."' 1' 5
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the second
stage of a Title VII suit in favor of plaintiffs by requiring the defendant to "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
6
question and consistent with business necessity."'
Thus, Michael Fisher argues, the defendant must
"prove both the non-racial nature of the program and
7
the necessity for retaining it in its current form."'

As for Title VI, Michael Fisher continues, since the
Title VI evidentiary structure was adopted from Title
VII, the 1991 amendments should be adopted as
well. 18 For the purposes of this paper, I will assume
the challenged practices are non-racial in nature,
and the focus of the defendant's burden discussion
will be on the necessity issue.
Several commentators argue that a defendant's
burden of proof in Title VI cases should be higher
than in Title VII cases. 19 The rationale is that Title VII
injects government interests and public policy into
the private sector where employers and employees
are presumptively contracting at will. 20 In contrast,
13. Fisher, supra note 11, at 320 (quoting Paul K. Sonn.
Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded Construction
L.J. 1577,
Projects after Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE
1598 (1992)).
14. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659
(1989).
I5. Id. at 660 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
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Title VI only applies to entities that elect to receive
federal funding. Therefore, entities choosing to take
federal money should have to meet a higher standard of proof when justifying their practices which
have a discriminatory impact on minorities. 2 1 This
reasoning is logical, but, unfortunately, it contradicts experience. Since the purpose of this paper is
to advise plaintiffs on how to pursue on a Title VI
transportation case in the Bay Area, I will not
explore the proposal.
The plaintiffs burden in the third stage may be
clarified by reference to United States Attorney
General Janet Reno's Memorandum to Heads of
Departments and Agencies that Provide Federal
Assistance to state and local agencies dated July 14,
1994.22 The President has the authority to review
and approve federal agency Title VI regulations.23 In
Executive Order 12,250, the President delegated
this statutory power to the Attorney General. 24 The
Attorney General's Memorandum explains the policy rationale behind Title VI and enunciates the disparate impact standard:
Individuals continue to be denied, on the
basis of their race, color, or national origin,
the full and equal opportunity to participate in or receive the benefits of programs
assisted by Federal funds. Frequently discrimination results from policies and practices that are neutral on their face but have
the effect of discriminating. Those policies
and practices must be eliminated unless
they are shown to be necessary to the program's operation and there is no less discrimi25
natory alternative.
The Attorney General's statement of the eviL
dentiary structure will provide the format for analyzing the potential Bay Area Title VI case. Thus, the
21. See Watson, supra note 6, at 971-73; see also Fisher, supra
at 321.
note 11,
22. See New York Urban League, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 905 F Supp. 1266, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). rev'd on othergrounds,
71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).

16. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A(i) (1994) (emphasis added).

24. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1996). See New York Urban
League, 905 F. Supp. at 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). rev'd on othergrounds,

17. Fisher, supra note 11, at 321 (emphasis in original).

71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).

18. Id.

25. New York Urban League, 905 F. Supp. at 1274, rev'd on
other grounds, 71 F3d 1031 (quoting Memorandum from U.S.

19. See Watson. supra note 6, at 971-73; see also Fisher, supra
note II. at 321.
20. See Watson, supra note 6, at 971-73; see also Fisher, supra
note 11,
at 321.

Attorney General to Heads of Departments and Agencies that

Provide Federal Assistance to state and local agencies (July 14,
1994) (second emphasis added)).
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burdens of proof may be summarized as follows: (1)
Plaintiffs burden of demonstrating a prima facie
case of disparate impact; (2) Defendant's burden of
demonstrating a legitimate business necessity; (3)
Plaintiffs burden of demonstrating a less discriminatory alternative.
C.

Liability of Defendants for Their Programs
and Activities
In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court
held that the receipt of federal financial assistance
by a program or unit of an institution does not make
other programs or units liable under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.26 Congress overruled the decision when
it passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
("Restoration Act").27 The Restoration Act restored
the "broad institution-wide application" of the Civil
Rights Act.28 The sections applicable to Title VI
cases state, in part:
For the purposes of this title, the term "program or activity" and the term "program"
mean all of the operations of(1)(A) a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a State of local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local
government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency
...to which the assistance is extended, in
the case of assistance to a State or local
government ....

29

Therefore, if a program or sub-unit of an agency
receives federal financial assistance, the whole
agency is subject to the provisions of Title VI.
Similarly, if an agency allocates the federal funds to
another agency, the allocating agency is subject to
the provisions of Title VI.30
26. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984).
27. Public L. No. 100-259, §2(2), 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
28. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1994).
30. See Radcliffv. Landau, 883 F.2d 1481, 1483 (9th Cir. 1989)
"Receipt of federal financial assistance by any student or portion
of a school thus subjects the entire school to Title VI coverage."
Id.
31. There is a third Title VI, mass transit case on point,
Committee for a Better Phila. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.,
1990 WL 121177 (E.D.Pa. 1990), aff'd , Committee for a Better
Phila. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth.. No. 90-1656 (3d Cir. filed
May 29, 1991), which will not be discussed since the court analyzed the claim under the pre-Civil Rights Act of 1991 evidentiary
structure.

III. Review of the New York and Los Angeles
31
Cases

A.

New York Urban League v. Metropolitan

TransportationAuthority
The plaintiffs in New York Urban League v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("New York Urban
League") alleged in Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York that fare increases of
20% on inner-city transit versus 9% on inter-city
commuter transit would disproportionately impact
racial minorities in violation of Title VI.32 The plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction in District Court, 33
34
but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The parties reached a settlement in February 1997
under which the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("NYMTA") agreed to pay up to
$150,000 to fund a study of transportation inequities 35 and to provide free transfers between the
subway and bus systems. 36 New York City also
agreed to provide $250 million in funds for rebuilding city transit and New York State agreed to restore
$128 million to the city transit system which had
been singled out for budget reductions. 37 An examination of the facts and both courts' applications of
Title VI in New York Urban League provides valuable
insights for potential plaintiffs in a Bay Area action.
1. Summary of Facts
The inner-city transit systems at issue were
New York City's subway and bus systems which are
administered by the New York City Transit Authority
("NYCTA"). 38 The inter-city commuter transportation
systems at issue were the Long Island Railroad
("LIRR") and the Metro-North Commuter Railroad
("Metro-North") (collectively, the "commuter
lines").3 9 Both NYCTA and the commuter lines operate under the umbrella of NYMTA which is a public
benefit corporation under New York law. 40 NYCTA is
32. See New York Urban League v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 905 F. Supp. at 1268, rev'd on other grounds, 71 F.3d 1031.
33. See id.at 1278-79.
34. See New York Urban League v. Metropolitan Transp.
Auth., 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
35. See Stephen McFarland, It Suits the MTA to Study Spending
in City vs. Burbs, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Feb. II. 1997, at 10.
36. See Statement of the New York Urban League and
Straphangers Campaign on the Settlement of Their Transit
Funding Lawsuit (February 1997) (on file with Hastings
West.Northwest Journalof Environmental Law and Policy).

37. See id.
38. See New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1033.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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a legally separate entity affiliated with NYMTA. The
commuter lines are wholly owned subsidiaries of
NYMTA. 41 U.S. DOT provides funding assistance to
42
NYCTA and the commuter lines through NYMTA.
For the purposes of the preliminary injunction
motion, the District Court accepted the plaintiffs'
assertions that NYCTA's ridership is 60% non-white
and that the commuter lines' ridership is less than
20% minority. 43 In August 1995, NYMTA proposed a
20% fare increase for NYCTA and a 9% fare increase
44
for the commuter lines.
2.

The District Court'sApplication of Title VI
a. Prima Facie Case
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the increases by
comparing operating costs and subsidies. Before
the District Court, the parties introduced a variety of
methods to measure the disparate impact on
minorities, or a lack thereof. Methods offered by the
plaintiffs included (a) comparing total revenues to
total subsidies for each system; (b) comparing total
subsidies per revenue passenger; (c) comparing
total subsidies per revenue vehicle mile; (d) comparing total subsidies per revenue passenger mile;
and (e) comparing the farebox recovery ratios of the
two systems (the ratio of total fares paid to the total
operating cost). 45 The defendants' offered method
was the ratio of the revenue per passenger mile to
operating costs, the reverse of the ratio of the subsidy per passenger mile to operating costs. 46 The
District Court focused on the farebox recovery
47
ratio.
The following table illustrates the respective
farebox recovery ratios, assuming the proposed fare
increases were implemented:
FAREBOX RECOVERY RATIOS

Jan. 95Aug. 95
NYCTA
48.3%
LIRR
38.2%
Metro North 47.4%

1996
Forecast
60.5%
40.8%
49.6%

1999
Forecast
54.6%
41.6%
49.8%48

The District Court found that "Itlhese projections by the MTA demonstrate that the proposed

fare increases result in a substantial reduction in
the present percentages of subsidy benefit enjoyed
by the NYCTA rider, and do not similarly reduce the
49
subsidy benefit enjoyed by the commuter."
Moreover, the District Court found that NYMTA had
not opposed the diversion of state subsidies from
NYCTA to the State's general fund. 50 Thus, the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden, according to the
District Court, with a prima facie case built on the
farebox recovery ratio comparison. 51
b. Defendant's Burden
The District Court then shifted the burden to
the defendants to show "legitimate, non discriminatory justifications or a business necessity for the
action."52 The District Court found NYMTA had presented neither a legitimate justification nor a business necessity.53 Although the District Court found
future deficits may indicate a business necessity for
NYCTA fare increases, the Court found it unnecessary to increase fares more for a system whose riders are 60% minority than for systems whose riders
are 80% white. 54 Again relying on the farebox recover ratio, the District Court stated:
No business reason has been shown to
demonstrate why the 173,000 riders of the
commuter lines, over eighty percent of
whom are white, should have approximately 60% and 50% of their transportation to
work costs paid by the government subsidies while only 40% of those costs are paid
for the 1.6 million persons, 969,000 of
whom are minorities, who depend on the
NYCTA subways and buses to get to work.
In fact, the Defendants offered no evidence to support any business necessity
for the disproportionate impact of the proposed fare increase on the NYCTA riders.
They seem to argue that low commuter
fares result in less use of automobiles on
the City streets and thus, less traffic congestion and pollution. [Citations omitted.l
However, the Defendants offered no evi-

41. See id.

48. Id.at 1276.

42. See id. at 1034.

49. Id.

43. See New York Urban League, 905 F. Supp. at 1272, rev'd
on
other grounds, 71 F.3d 1031.
44. See id. at 1268.
45. See id. at 1275.
46. See id.
47. See id.

50. See id.

51. See id.at 1275-77.
52. Id.at 1277.
53. Id.at 1278.
54. See id.

Kevin LSiegel
dence that the boards of directors were
presented with any studies to demonstrate
that these undesirable effects would occur
if the fare increase resulted in all farebox
55
recovery ratio no higher than the present.
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More to the point, the Circuit Court held that
"the farebox recovery ratio is not a sufficient basis
for a finding of disparate impact."6' The Circuit
Court reasoned the ratio is too narrow a focus:
It does not reveal the extent to which one
system might have higher costs associated
with its operations-costs stemming from
different maintenance requirements,
schedules of operation, labor contracts,
and so on. There is no reason to assume
that the expenses of each system would
bear any sort of proportionate relationship,
particularly when those systems are fundamentally different in terms of how they
carry passengers, frequency of stops, and
operating schedules.... The farebox recovery ratio thus says very little about the overall allocation of funds to the two systems
which is the focus of the complaint in this
action. 62

3. The Court of Appeals' Reversal
The Second Circuit reversed the District Court's
preliminary injunction. The Circuit Court's general
problem with lower court's opinion was that it
"assessed the impact of the NYCTA and commuter
line fare increases without examining the largerfinancial and administrative picture of which those fare
56
increases are a part."

a. Prima Facie Case
The Circuit Court chastised the District Court for
relying on the farebox recovery ratio in concluding
that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of
disparate impact. First, since "the underlying claim
challenges the total allocation of subsidies," the District
Court should have "assessed whether any measure or
combination of measures could adequately capture
the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers."57 The Circuit Court noted,
but did not endorse, NYMTs argument that
the relative costs borne and benefits received
by passengers of the two systems cannot be measured at all, because users of the NYCTA derive significant but difficult-to-quantify benefits from the
subsidization of the commuter lines, including a
reduction in traffic congestion, pollution and other
adverse effects that would accompany an increased
58
use of cars by those commuting from the suburbs.
Moreover, the Circuit Court recognized
NYMTs argument that, to the extent that the relative costs and benenefits were measurable, measurements other than the farebox recovery ratio
59
should have been used.
The District Court had implicitly found the farebox recovery ratio to be the most appropriate measure, but the Circuit Court held that the District
Court "could not properly find a disparate impact on
the sole basis of the farebox recovery ratio unless it
reasonably found that [the] ratio would be a reliable
indicator of a disparate impact."60

b. Defendant's Burden
The Circuit Court also found "the district court's
conclusion as to the second prong of the analysiswhether the defendants have shown a substantial
legitimate justification for the challenged conduct.
. ."to be unsupported. 63 The District Court acknowledged that 'a fare increase for the NYCTA is a business necessity in the near future,"' 64 but the Circuit
Court disagreed with the conclusion that alterna65
tives existed to raising fares disproportionately.
For example, the District Court did not decide
whether NYMTA could shift fare revenues from the
commuter lines to NYCTA, or whether the shift
would significantly affect the need to raise fares. 66
A.

Labor/Community Strategy Centerv. Los Angeles
County Metropolitan TransportationAuthority
The plaintiffs in Labor/Community Strategy Center
v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan TransportationAuthority ("Los Angeles County MTA") alleged in Federal
District Court for the Central District of California
that the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority's ("LACMTA") substantially
greater allocation of funds to its rail systems over

55. Id.

61. Id.

56. New York Urban League. 71 F.3d at 1037 (emphasis

62. Id. (emphasis added).

added).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Revised Opinion and Order at 29, New York
Urban League, 905 F.Supp. at 1278).

59. See id. at 1038.

65. See id. at 1038-39.

60. id.

66. See id. at 1039.
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its bus system had the purpose and effect of discriminating against racial minorities. 67 The plaintiffs' financial analysis focused on the total allocation of funds, both capital and operating, to the
transportation systems.

68

1. Summary of Facts
LACMTA operates a bus system and a rail system (the Red, Blue and Green Lines). In 1992, prior
to the opening of the Green line, the bus system
carried 94% of the riders but received only 29% of
LACMTA's $2.6 billion capital and operating budget.69 In contrast, the rail lines carried less than 6%

of the passengers but received 71% of LACMTA's
capital and operating budget. 70 MTA also created,
staffs and primarily funds Metrolink, a commuter
rail service with five lines which all converge in
7
downtown Los Angeles. '
According to the plaintiffs, bus ridership was
80% minority. 72 The rail lines ridership was projected to be two-thirds minority.7 3 The Metrolink ridership was estimated as 69% white. 74 On July 13, 1994,
LACMTA Board voted to increase bus cash fares by
23%, eliminate the $42 monthly pass providing
unlimited bus rides, and retain the $0.90 bus
tokens.7 5 The following week, the Board voted to
spend another $123 million on a rail project
designed to serve Pasadena. 76
67. See Plaintiffs' complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 2-3, Labor/Community Strategy Ctr. v. Los Angeles
County Metro. Transp. Auth., (C.D.Cal. 1995) (No. CV 94-5936)
Ihereinafter "Los Angeles County MTA"J (on file with Hastings
West.Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy).

68. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Genuine Issues of Material
Fact in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary judgment
or.' in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication. Los Angeles
County MTA, (No. CV 94-5936); Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary judgment or,in the Alternative,
Summary Adjudication, Los Angeles County MTA, (No. CV
94-5936) (both documents on file with Hastings XVest.Northwest
Journalof Environmental Law and Policy).

69. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Genuine Issues of Material
Fact, supra note 68, at 4-5.

2. PreliminaryInjunction and Consent Decree
The plaintiffs did well at the early hearings. The
District Court entered a Temporary Restraining
Order on September 1, 1994, enjoining the defen77
dants from implementing the proposed changes.
On September 12, 1994, the Court entered a preliminary injunction, 78 which was subsequently modified on January 25, 1995, to allow for fare increases
79
but not the elimination of the monthly pass.
On October 29, 1996, the plaintiffs entered a
consent decree with LACMTA in which the agency
promised more buses, fare relief for bus riders, less
overcrowding, more transit police, and a role in the
transit decision-making for the plaintiffs for up to
ten years, under federal court supervision. 80 LACMTA agreed to add 102 buses to its fleet by July,
1997,81 and to add a total of 275 buses over the next
six years. 82 LACMTA also agreed to reduce the
monthly pass from $49 to $42, to sell bi-monthly
passes for $21 and weekly passes for $11, and to
freeze the current $1.35 cash fare and the $0.90
token fare for two years. 83 In addition, LACMTA
promised a $0.75 off-peak fare on a bus line utilized
by transit dependent riders 84 and set a goal to
reduce the "maximum load factor ceiling" on all
routes from 1.45 to 1.2 within five years.8 5 Finally,
the Consent Decree established the Joint Working
Group-an institution composed of bus riders and
75. See idat 3.
76. See id.at 3.
77. See id.; Nora Zamichow and Henry Chu, judge Blocks Bus
Fare Hike, Sets Review, L.A. WMEs,Sept. 2, 1994, at Al.
78. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (September
12, 1994), Los Angeles County MTA, (No.
<http://www.igc.apc.org/lctr/pi-order.html>.

CV 94-5936)

79. See Stipulation and Proposed Order re: Modification of
Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (January 25, 1995), Los

Angeles County MTA, (No. CV 94-5936) <http-l/www.igc.apc.org/
lctr/pi-order.html>. The modification was based on an agreement

by the parties to revise the preliminary injunction. See also Letter
of Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, to Kevin Siegel. supra note 70, at 5.
80. See Consent Decree, Los Angeles County MTA (C.D. Cal.

70. See id. Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, an expert witness in the
action who participated in the calculations, has stated that the
29/71% calculated split was based on transit subsidy funds, not
the total LACMTA budget. See Letter from Thomas A. Rubin, CPA.
to Kevin Siegel (April 4, 1997) (on file with Hastings West.Northwest
Journalof Environmental Law and Policy).

1996) (No. CV 94-5936) (on file with Hastings West.Northwest journal
of Environmental Law and Policy).

71. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Genuine Issues of Material

83. See Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 6; see also Simon,
supra note 82, at 2.
84. See Consent Decree, supra note 80. at 6; see also Simon,
supra note 82. at 2.
85. See Consent Decree, supra note 80, at 4. On a 43 seat
bus, this load factor reduction would reduce the number of
passengers required to stand from 19 to 9. See also Letter from
Thomas A.Rubin, CPA. to Kevin Siegel, supra note 70, at 5.

Fact. supra note 68. at 4.

72. See id.at 6.
73. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for

Summary judgment, supra note 68, at 3.
74. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Genuine Issues of Material
Fact, supra note 68. at 5, 12.

81. See Consent Decree. supra note 80, at 6.
82. See Richard Simon, Settlement of Bus Suit Approved, L.A.
at 2.
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transit officials-to ensure implementation of the
agreement.8 6 If the Joint Working Group is unable to
resolve a dispute regarding implementation of the
consent decree, the matter will be referred to a special master, and if necessary, be reviewed by the
87
District Court.
IV. Bay Area Transportation Inequities
A. The Inequity
The inequity is simply stated: The Alameda
Contra Costa Transit District ("AC Transit"), an East
Bay bus system with a mostly minority ridership,
has raised fares and instituted severe service cuts
while the Bay Area Rapid Transit District ("BART"),
an inter-city rail system with a largely white ridership, is in the process of extending its rails to mostly white communities, although it has instituted
three fare hikes in three years. Both agencies
receive federal, state and local funds which are allocated through the Metropolitan Transportation
Commission ("MTC"), 88 an affiliated agency which
provides comprehensive regional planning and
allocates subsidies for transportation agencies in
the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area.89
AC Transit buses serve a 68% non-white ridership 90 in cities along the San Francisco Bay's east
86. See Consent Decree, supra note 80. at 11;seealso Simon,
supra note 82, at 2.
87. See Consent Decree. supra note 80. at 10-11; see also

Simon, supra note 82,at 2.
88. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
89. See
METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION.
TRANSPORTATION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE NINE-COUNTY SAN
FRANCISCO BAY AREA,1995,vol. I, § 1,at 5(1994) [hereinafter "MTC,

1995 TIP"].
90. See ALAMEDA CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT DISTRICT, SHORT RANGE

TRANSIT PLAN, 1995-2005, at 27 [hereinafter "AC TRANSIT, 1995
SRTP"l. See also Crain & Associates, Inc., AC Transit On-Board
Survey 14 (1985) (on file with Hastings West-Norhwest Journal of
Environmental Law and Policy).

91. Cities AC Transit serves include: Richmond, Berkeley,
AC Transit also provides
transbay service to San Francisco. AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP supra
note 90, at 28.
Hayward, Oakland, and Union City.

92. See Id. at 36, 144.
93. See AC Transit Postpones Cuts in Night Service, S.F. CHRON.,
November 25, 1995, at A23 (AC Transit had estimated a $11.7 mil-

lion budget shortfall for 1996); Tara Shioya, AC Transit Struggles as
Budget Shrinks, S.F. CHRON., November 20, 1995, at Al 3 (AC Transit
analysts projected a $45 million budget shortfall in 2001); Tara
Shioya, AC Transit Delays Cuts in Weekend, Late-Night Service, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 21. 1995, at AI7.
94. See Tara Shioya, AC Transit Delays Cuts in Weekend, LateNight Service, supra note 93, at Al 7.

shore.9 ' In mid 1995, AC Transit raised adult cash
fares from $1.10 to $1.25, local tickets from $0.90 to
$1.00, and local passes from $40.00 to $45.00.92 In
late 1995, AC Transit cut evening bus service from
75 to 63 lines from 7 p.m to 10 p.m. and reduced
service on 27 additional lines from 10 p.m to midnight.93 They also planned to eliminate all bus service from midnight to 5 a.m in the East Bay 94 and to
cut weekend service by about two-thirds. 95 Overall,
96
services were cut approximately 11%.
BART provides rail transit across much of the Bay
Area. 97 BART has instituted three fare increases over
three years which has raised the adult base fare from
$0.80 to $1.10.98 BART is in the process of extending
its rail system in stages, with the assistance of
tremendous capital subsidies. BART has recently
extended its rails to North Concord/Martinez,
Pittsburg/Bay Point, Dublin and Colma,9 9 and intends
to lay tracks to Warm Springs and the San Francisco
and Oakland airports. 00 Further out, BART hopes to
extend to cities such as Antioch and Livermore.' 0'
A 1992 BART passenger profile survey revealed
02
that BART's ridership is about 63% white.1 As to
the racial makeup of three cities to which BART is
extending or plans to extend its service, 1989 census data indicates Pittsburg is 61% white, Dublin is
78% white, and Antioch is 86% white.10 3
95. See id.
96. See
METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION,
TRANSPORTATION
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM FOR THE NINE-COUNTY SAN
FRANCISCO BAY AREA, 1997, vol. II, at 17 (1996) [hereinafter "MTC,
1997 TIP"I.
97. BART currently provides rail transit between Bay Area
cities including San Francisco, Colma, Richmond, Berkeley,

Oakland, Fremont, Walnut Creek and Concord. See BAY AREA RAPID
TRANSIT DISTRICT. SHORT RANGE TRANSIT PLAN, July 1996 through June
2006, ch. 1, at 3 fig.1-2 (1996) [hereinafter "BART, 1996 SRTP"I.
98. See BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, SHORT RANGE TRANSIT
PLAN, July 1995 through June 2005, ch. 2, at 22 (1995) [hereinafter

"BART, 1995 SRTP"]; seealso Benjamin Pimentel, BARTS Third
Annual Fare Increase Coming Tuesday, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1997, at
A13.
99. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 3. at 4. See also
Carl Nolte, BART Premiering New Line, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1997. at
A23.

100. See

BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRIcT, CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT

PROGRAM, July 1996 through June 2006, ch. 2. at 4-5 (1996) Ihereinafter "BART, 1996 CIP"I.
101. See id. ch. 2, at 5.
102. See BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, 1992 PASSENGER
PROFILE SURVEY SUMMARY REPORT, A-16 tbl.19 (May 1993) (on file

with Hastings West.Norhwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy).
103. See data from the RTKnet. provided by Richard T. Drury
at Communities for a Better Environment in San Francisco (on
file with Hastings West.Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and
Policy).
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The issue is whether MTC, BART and other
potential defendants' °4 utilize "criteria or methods
of administration" in the allocation of the agencies'
operating and capital subsidies-federal, state and
local--"which have the effect of subjecting persons
to discrimination because of their race" in violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.105
B.

Financial Matters
This section outlines AC Transit's and BART's
operating and capital costs, revenues, subsidies,
and performance statistics. The discussion includes
more information on funding than is referred to infra
Part IV.C, "Presenting a Title VI Claim," in order to
provide potential plaintiffs with a more complete
picture of the agencies' budgets and performance
statistics so they could best utilize the legal arguments which follow or formulate their own.
1. AC Transit
a. Operating Finances
i. Operating Budgets and Projections
AC Transit provided nearly 62 million trips in
Fiscal Year ("FY") 1994/95.106 AC Transit's operating
expenses for FY 1994/95 were $148.7 million, and its
total revenues were $141.5 million, resulting in an
operating deficit of over $7 million. 107 Of the nearly
$142 million in operating revenue, $33.5 million was
fare revenue, and the remaining $108.0 million was
operating subsidies. 10s
Before the 1995/96 service cuts were made,
MTC estimated AC Transit would run an operating
deficit of $4.0 million.' 9 Shortly before instituting
the service cuts, AC Transit announced that the
operating deficit would grow in 1996 to $11.7 million.IO
In the end, AC Transit enjoyed an operating surplus of $1.9 million in FY 1995/96"' while providing
64.0 million trips." 2 AC Transit's operating expens104. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
105. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (Dep't Transp. 1995).
106. See
ALAMEDA-CONTRA
COSTA
TRANSIT
DISTRICT,
COMPREHENSIvE ANNUAL FINANCIALREPORT FOR THE FISCALYEAR ENDED

Disctiminntlon
Systems
Transit Systems
Moss Transit
Funding ofof Mass
the Funding
inthe
Disc~minofion in
es totaled $149.4 million and its revenues totaled
$151.4 million.'" 3 Of the $151.4 million in total revenue, $37.1 million was fare revenue, and the
remaining $114.3 million was operating subsidies
and income such as interest.'l 4 Despite the surplus
in FY 1995/96, MTC estimates that AC Transit will
again run operating deficits which will grow to $16
5
million in FY 1998/99.'

For FY 2004/05, AC Transit projects operating
expenses of $219.5 million and revenues of $174.2
million, which would result in a total operating
deficit of $45.3 million." 6 Of the projected $174.2
million in operating revenue, AC Transit projects
fare revenues of only $35.5 million, the remainder
7
being operating subsidies."
ii. Operating Subsidies
AC Transit receives federal, state and local
operating subsidies which are allocated through
MTC. Federal subsidies are allocated under sections
8 and 9 of the Federal Transit Act ("FTA'), as amended by the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 ("ISTEA").1 8 AC Transit's section 9 operating subsidy has dropped from over $6
million in the early 1990's to $5.5 million in FY
1994/95 and just under $3 million in FY 1995/96.119
AC Transit receives section 8 financial assistance of
20
about $41,000 per year.
AC Transit receives state operating subsidies
from the State Transit Assistance program ("STA")
and from the Transportation Development Act
("TDA").' 2' The STA funds are derived from a
statewide sales tax on gasoline and diesel fuel. 22
Half of the STA revenues are allocated according to
population, and the other half are allocated according to operator revenues. 23 The TDA funds are
derived from a statewide 1/4 cent sales tax and are
returned by the State to the county of origin.124 MTC
estimates AC Transit's STA subsidy will range
113. See id.at vii, xiv.
114. See id.at vii.
115. MTC, 1997 TIP, supra note 96, vol. II,at 17.

JUNE 30, at 45 (1996) [hereinafter "AC.TRANSIT, 1996 ANN. REP."].

116. See AC TRANSIT,
1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 148 tbl.5-7.

Both AC Transit and BART operate under fiscal years which begin
on July 1. See id. at title: see also BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100, at
subtitle.

117. See id.

107. SeeAC TRANSIT, 1996ANN. REP., supra note 106, at v,vii, xiv.
108. See id. at vii, xiv.
109. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. 1, § 5, at 5.

110. See AC Transit Postpones Cuts in Night Service, supra note
93, at A23.
II1. SeeACTRAsrr, 1996 ANN. REP.. supra note 106, at v, vii, xiv.
112. Seeid. at 45.

118. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. 1, § 2, at 1; see also
AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 78-79.
119. See AC TRANSIT. 1996 ANN. REP.,
supra note 106, at xii.
120. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. I, § 5, at 5.
121. SeeAC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 128-29.
122. See id. at 129.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 128.
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between $7-8 million per year through FY
1998/99.125 MTC estimates AC Transit's TDA funds
will grow from $39 million to $41 million in FY
1998/99.126

Under state law, AB 1107, AC Transit receives
operating subsidies from a 1/2 cent sales tax
imposed in three BART counties (Alameda, Contra
Costa, and San Francisco). 27 AB 1107 dedicates
75% of the revenue collected to BART. 128 MTC has
discretion to allocate the remaining 25% among
BART, AC Transit, and San Francisco Municipal
Railway ("MUNI"). 129 MTC has historically divided
the discretionary 25% between AC Transit and
MUNI.130
AC Transit also receives operating subsidies
31
from the proceeds of 1/2 cent county sales taxes.1
The tax was authorized by the voters of Alameda
County in Measure B and by the voters of Contra
Costa County in Measure C.1 32 Together, the sales

taxes provided nearly $10 million in revenues for AC
Transit in FY 1995/96.133 A portion of the revenue
generated by the sales taxes is used for capital
34

expenditures.1

BART used to reimburse AC Transit directly
for feeder service. In FY 1989/90, the payment
was approximately $6 million. 35 In FY 1991/92,
BART and AC Transit signed a revenue sharing
agreement in which MTC directly allocates
13 6
BART's revenue-based STA funds to AC Transit.
MTC set $4.0 million as the base amount of the
payment, but in FY 1993/94 and FY 1994/95, the
payments were only $3.4 and $3.9 million,
37
respectively, due to State budget constraints.
In FY 1995/96, the total payment was $4.6 million, including $0.6 million for prior year adjustments. 138 AC Transit receives additional operating subsidies, about $30 million annually, from
property taxes. 39

b. Capital Finances
i. Capital Projects
AC Transit has two sets of capital improvement
program projections, one unconstrained and one
constrained. Over the next ten years, from FY
1996/97 through FY 2005/06, AC Transit's unconstrained plan calls for $757 million in spending on
capital projects. 140 Under a financially constrained
scenario per MTC revenue projections, AC Transit
would only spend $269 million on capital projects
over the same ten years. 4' The capital projects
include replacing buses, developing transit centers
to facilitate transfers, installing automated loudspeaker systems on buses in compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and acquiring
42
cleaner-burning buses.
ii. CapitalSubsidies
According to AC Transit's unconstrained capital
improvement program projections, only $200 million
of the $757 million funds needed have been determined. 43 In other words, AC Transit must secure
$557 million in funding to meet its unconstrained
capital spending plans.144 The determined and undetermined funding is to come from federal, state and
local subsidies. AC Transit receives federal capital
funds under FTA sections 9 and 3 ($99 million total
from FY 1994/95-1998/99 and $29 million total from
FY 1994/95-1996/97, respectively). 45 AC Transit
receives state capital funds from bridge toll revenues,
Transportation System Management funds, Flexible
Congestion Relief funds and AB 434.146
Under AB 434, the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District ("BAAQMD") imposes a $4.00
surcharge on vehicle registration fees in the
agency's jurisdiction. 147 BAAQMD has some discretion on how to spend 60% of the revenues. Of this
60% portion of the revenues, BAAQMD must first
48
allocate funding to pre-established programs.

125. See MTC. 1997 TIP, supra note 96,vol. I1 at 19.

137. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90. at 125.

126. See id.

138. See AC TRANSIT, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at xii.

127. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90. at 128.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Seeid. at 129.
132. See id.
133. See AC TRANSIT. 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at vii.
134. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP. supra note 90,at 129.
135. See id.
at 125.
136. See id.; see also AC TRANSIT, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106,

at xi-xii.

139. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. 1, § 5. at 5; AC
vii.

TRANSIT, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at

140. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 120, tbl.

4-7.
141. See id.
at 121. tbl. 4-8.

142. See id. at 72-122.
143. See id. at 120 tbl. 4-7.
144. See id.
145. See MTC, 1995 TIP. supra note 89. vol. 1, § 5, at 7.
146. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 79-80.
147. See id. at 80.
148. See id.
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BAAQMD awards the remainder of the 60% portion
49
to eligible agencies competing for the funds.
Finally, AC Transit plans to set aside 2% of its
unrestricted general operating revenues to create
50
capital reserves.'
c. Performance Statistics
There are various statistics transportation
agencies use to measure their operating performances and efficiencies. The statistics provided by
the agencies do not reflect capital expenditures.
A common statistic is the farebox recovery
ratio which measures the percentage of operating
costs recovered by fare income. In the years since
FY 1990/9 1, AC Transit's farebox recovery ratio has
been approximately 23%.151 In FY 1994/95, AC
Transit's farebox recovery ratio was 23.6%, and in
FY 1995/96, it was 24.5%.152 In order to be eligible
for inter-governmental funding, AC Transit must
maintain a minimum farebox recovery ratio of
30%;153 however, the ratio includes other revenues
such as the sales taxes generated under Measures
54
B and C.'

Other operating performance measures are
cost per passenger ($2.69 in FY 1994/95),155 cost per
vehicle mile ($6.29 in FY 1994/95),156 passengers per
hour (28.7 in FY 1994/95), 157 passengers per mile
(2.33 in FY 1994/95),158 and cost per passenger mile
($0.62 in FY 1993/94). 159
2.

BART
a. Operating Finances
i. Operating Budget and Projections
BART provided 72.1 million trips In FY
1994/95.160 BART's operating ,expenses for FY
1994/95 were $263.9 million, and its total revenues
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See AC TRANSIT,
1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at ix.
152. See id. at xvi.
153. See AC TRANsiT, 1995 SRTP. supra note 90, at 34.
154. See Letter from Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, to Kevin Siegel,
supra note 70, at 7.
155. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP. supra note 90, at 48.
156. See id. at 47.
157. See id. at 49.
158. See id. at 50.
159. $135.3 million operating expenses divided by 217.0
million passenger miles equals $0.62 per passenger mile. See
Federal Transportation Administration. U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
Transit Profiles: Agencies in Urbanized Areas Exceeding 200,000
Population for the 1994 National Transit Database Report Year, at
226(1994).
160. See BART, 1995 SRTP supra note 98, ch. 2. at 14.

were $275.2 million, resulting in a total operating
surplus of $1 1.3 million.'61 Of the $275.2 million in
total revenue, $116.5 million was operating revenue, and the remaining $158.7 was other revenue,
62
essentially subsidies. 1
BART provided 72.4 million trips in FY
1995/96.163 For that year, MTC estimated BART
would run a of $3.2 million total operating surplus. 64 In fact, BART ran a de minimis deficit of
approximately $1000.165 MTC now projects that
BART will run an operating deficit of $9.4 million in
FY 1998/99.16
For FY 2005/06, BART estimates operating
expenses of $410 million and net passenger revenue
of $210.7 million. 67 These projections show an
operating surplus which would be allocated to bond
debt service and capital projects, among other
expenditures. 68 For example, BART plans to allocate $76 million over ten years from its operating
budget to capital projects. 69
ii. Operating Subsidies
Like AC Transit, BART's federal, state and local
subsidies are allocated through MTC. As for federal
operating subsidies, BART receives FTA section 8
funds, about $41,000 annually, 170 but no section 9
funds. 171
BART receives state subsides from the TDA and
the STA.' 72 BART received approximately $595 million in TDA funds in FY 1995/96.173 However, BART's
revenue-based STA funds are allocated to AC
Transit under the revenue sharing agreement discussed above, 74 and aside from funds employed for
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities
Act, the remainder has typically been allocated to
75
BART's capital projects.'
161. See BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DisTRICr.
1996 ANN. REP. at 7

(1996) [hereinafter "BART 1996 ANN. REP."J.
162. See id.
163. See BART, 1996 SRTP supra note 97, ch. 2, at 11.
164. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. I, § 5. at 14.
165. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97,ch. 2,at 20, 22.
166. See MTC, 1997 TIP,supra note 96, vol. II. at 33.
167. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 4,at 10.
168. See id.

169. See id. ch. 4. at 9-10.
170. See MTC, 1997 TIP, supra note 96, vol. II,
at 33; see also
MTC, 1995 TIP. supra note 79, vol. I, § 5,at 14.
171. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89. vol. I, § 5, at 14-15.
172. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 2,at 20, fig.2-5.
173. See id.
174. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.a.ii; AC TRANSIT, 1996

ANN. REP., supra note 106, at xi-xii.
175. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 4,at 5.
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In FY 1994/95, MTC estimated BART's AB 1107
operating subsidy to be approximately $114 million. 176 The subsidy is expected to grow to just
under $146 million by FY 1998/99.177 BART receives
about $13 million annually from property taxes.178
b.

Capital Finances
i. Capital Projects
Like AC Transit, BART has a constrained ("Track
One") as well as an unconstrained ("Track Two") capital improvement program. Under Track One, from
FY 1996/97 through FY 2005/06, BART plans to fund
$3.710 billion in projects. 179 Under Track Twowhich includes the Track One constrained scenario-BART plans to fund a total of $6.817 billion
in projects. 180
BART is extending its rail system in three phases. Under "Phase One," BART has completed extensions to Colma, North Concord/Martinez,
Pittsburg/Bay Point, and East Dublin/Pleasanton,
and plans an extension to San Francisco
International Airport. 181 These Phase One projects
are included in the Track One plans. In addition,
BART plans a Warm Springs extension partly under
182
Track One and partly under Track Two.
Under Phases Two and Three, BART plans an
Oakland Airport Connector and extensions to
Antioch, Livermore, the San Ramon Valley, and
other corridors. 183 These extensions are included
84
under the Track Two plans.
It is illustrative to highlight the capital costs of
some of the extensions, particularly the Track One
East Bay extensions, given that AC Transit is an East
Bay transit provider. The Pittsburg/Bay Point extension's total capital cost was $506 million.18 5 The
completed East Dublin/Pleasanton extension's total
capital cost was $517 million. 186 The Warm Springs
extension's total capital cost is projected to be $541
176. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89, at vol. 1,§ 5. at 14.
177. See MTC. 1997 TIP,supra note 96. vol. II,
at 33.
178. See id.; see also MTC. 1995 TIP supra note 89. vol. 1, § 5,at 14.
179. See BART, 1996 CIP,supra note 100, ch. I,at 7.

180. See id.
181. See Nolte, May Opening for BART's Dublin Line, supra note
90, at Al 5; BART, 1996 CIP,supra note 100, ch. 2, at 4.
182. See BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100, ch. 2,at 5.
183. See id. ch. 2, at 4-5.
184. See id.
ch. 2, at 5.
185. See id. ch. 3, at 10.
186. See Catherine Bowman, Not Everyone Is On Board With
BART's Dublin Extension, S.F. CHRON., May 12, 1997 at Al.
187. See BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100, ch. 2, at 5.
188. See id.
189. See BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT, CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM. JULY 1995 THROUGH JUNE 2005, at 65 (1995) [hereinafter

"BART. 1995 CIP".

million, which is not fully funded.

87

The capital cost

for the Antioch extension, a Track Two project, is
188
undetermined, and it is not fully funded.
Note that the East Dublin/Pleasanton extension is part of a 13.8 mile double track extension
which includes two other stations (Castro Valley
and West Dublin/Pleasanton). 8 9 The Pittsburg/Bay
Point extension added only 5 miles of track from the
recently opened North Concord station. 19 0
Considering only the Phase One extensions in the
East Bay, BART still plans to raise at least $636 million
to fund the projects. The Warm Springs extension
needs $487 million, and the Oakland Airport
Connector needs approximately $149 million. 191
ii. CapitalSubsidies
BART's federal subsidies for capital projects
include FTA section 9 funds ($128 million from FY
1994/95-1998/99) and FTA section 3 funds ($183
million from FY 1994/95-1998/99). 192 The subsidy
sources for BART's East Bay extensions is unclear. It
appears BART is not receiving federal assistance
and may be relying exclusively on state and local

funds. For example, from 1995-1997, the East
Dublin/Pleasanton extension secured subsidies

from the State for $4 million and from local sources
for $96 million, but it did not secure any federal
funds. 93 Similarly, the West Pittsburg extension
secured only state and local funds in 1995.194
c. Performance Statistics
BART's farebox recovery ratio was 47.6% in FY
1994/95 and 50.6% in FY 1995/96.195 BART projects
that the farebox recovery ratio will peak at 54.2% in
FY 1998/99 and drop to 51.4% in FY 2005/06.196
BART's cost per passenger mile was about $0.23 in
both FY 1993/94197 and FY 1994/95198 and is project-

ed to be $0.27 in FY 1997/98 and again in 2005/06.19
190. See Carl Nolte, Bay Area Spending More, But Commute
Worsens, S.F. CHRON., May 6. 1996, at A6.
191. See BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100, ch. 3, at 10.
192. See MTC, 1995 TIP, supra note 89. vol. I, § 5, at 15.

193. See id.vol. 1,§ 5,at 21.
194. See id. vol. 1,§ 5, at 22-23.
195. See BART, 1996 ANN. REP.,
supra note 161, at 23.
196. See BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 4, at 19.
197. $210.5 million operating expenses divided by 916.0
million passenger miles equals $0.23 per passenger mile. See
Federal Transportation Administration, U.S. Dep't of Transp.,
Transit Profiles: Agencies in Urbanized Areas Exceeding 200,000
Population for the 1994 National Transit Database Report Year,
supra note 159, at 233; see also BART, 1995 SRTP, supra note 98, ch.
2, at 22.
198. See BART, 1995 SRTP, supra note 98, ch. 2, at 26.
199. See BART, 1996 SRTP supra note 97, ch. 4, at 26.
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Presenting a Title VI Claim
AC Transit riders, the potential plaintiffs, are
suffering through severe cuts in service, especially
on weekends and after 7:00 p.m. 200 AC Transit's ridership is largely minority.20 ' Meanwhile, BART riders
are enjoying increased service through rail extensions. BARTs ridership is already mostly white, and
its extensions are going to cities which are largely
white. 20 2 On the surface, these facts appear to show
discriminatory impact. The question is whether
MTC and other potential defendants utilize criteria
or methods of administration which effect the disparate impact.
As a preliminary matter, potential defendants
include MTC and BART, which both receive federal
funds, and the State of California. The State may
contend it is not a proper plaintiff under Section
2000d of Title VI because it is not a "program or
activity." However, California would be a proper
defendant under "a long line of cases in which a
state was a Title VI defendant even though it was
not a 'program or activity."' 203 BAAOMD may also be
a potential defendant, if it receives federal funds, as
it has discretion to allocate 60% of AB 434 funds to
20 4
capital projects.
Each agency is subject to the provisions of Title
VI on an "institution-wide" basis as each receives
federal financial assistance or allocates the same
for or through its "programs or activities." 205 Further
research is needed to uncover whether BAAOMD
funding practices have favored BART extension projects over AC Transit capital projects.
1.

Building the Prima Facie Case
a. Subsidy Per Passenger: Three
Ways to Compare Relative
Subsidies
AC Transit riders have essentially three ways to
compare MTC's allocation of subsidies per passenger. First, AC Transit riders could argue MTC allocates operating subsidies in a manner which has a
disparate impact on minorities. Second, AC Transit
riders could argue MTC allocates capital subsidies in
a manner which has a disparate impact on minorities. Third, AC Transit riders could argue MTC's total
allocation of subsidies-operating and capital-has a
disparate impact on minorities. The third is the
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most complete of the three options and comports
with a broad reading of the Second Circuit's opinion
in New York Urban League as well as with the plaintiffs' successful strategy in Los Angeles County MTA.
i.

MTC Allocates Operating
Subsidies in a Manner which has a
DisparateImpact on Minorities
The first option would not likely succeed. MTC
does not appear to allocate operating subsidies disproportionately between BART and AC Transit. For
example, in FY 1995/96, BART provided 12% more
passenger trips annually (72.4 million for BART v.
64.0 million for AC Transit) but was estimated to
have received only 9% more in total operating subsidies ($I 16.1 million for BART v. $105.2 million for
AC Transit ).206 Under Title VI, AC Transit riders
would need only to show that MTC's allocation of
operating subsidies has a discriminatory effect.
That it appears to do, on the surface at least, as AC
Transit's largely minority ridership is suffering service cuts while BART's largely white ridership is
enjoying expanded service.
But the cause of the deficits appears attributable to comparatively weak operating revenues
rather than weak operating subsidies. MTC estimated AC Transit's operating revenues totaled only
$50.8 million in FY 1995/96207 while it estimated
BART's totaled $155.3 million. 208 The operating revenue difference is reflected in the agencies' farebox
recovery ratios. AC Transit's farebox recovery ratio
grew to a meager 24.5% in FY 1995/96 209 while
BART's was a healthy 50.6%.210
Even if a court found AC Transit riders presented a prima facie showing of disparate impact, MTC
could present several arguments to show a business necessity for not increasing AC Transit's operating subsidies to offset the weak operating revenues. For example, MTC could argue that increasing operating subsidies would only exacerbate AC
Transit's inefficiency. Presumably, MTC has a duty to
ensure its affiliated agencies operate efficiently.
Finally, the burden would shift back to the AC
Transit riders to show a less discriminatory alternative. One alternative would be to guarantee AC
Transit adequate operating subsidies to restore services. But it is counter-intuitive to argue that the

200. See discussion supra Part IVA.

205. See discussion supra Part ii.C.

201. See id.

206. See discussion supra Parts Iv.A. .a and 2.a.

202. See id.

207. See MTC. 1995 TIP, supra note 89, vol. 1. § 5, at 5.

203. Association of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 836 F.Supp. 1534. 1541 (N.D.Cal. 1993).
204. See discussion supra Part Iv.B.I.b.2.

208. See id.vol. I,§ 5, at 14.
209. See AC TRANsIT, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at xvi.
210. See BART, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 161. at 23.
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more inefficiently a transit agency operates, at least
with respect to farebox recovery, the more the agency should be subsidized. Under this theory, there is
no logical stopping point. As long as minorities
would be hurt by decreasing services on AC Transit,
funding would be increased, even as cost per passenger soared and farebox recovery ratio dropped.
ii.

MTC Allocates Capital Subsidies
in a Manner which has a
DisparateImpact on Minorities
The second option for presenting a prima facie
case, that MTC allocates capital subsidies in a manner which has a disparate impact on minorities,
provides an incomplete picture. The immediate discriminatory impact for AC Transit riders is reduced
operations, not a lack of subsidies for capital projects. However, creative plaintiffs could fashion an
argument that if MTC were to allocate capital subsidies to AC Transit in proportion to its allocation of
capital subsidies to BART, AC Transit would have
beautiful, clean, fuel efficient buses departing from
state of the art transit centers which would tremendously increase ridership and operating revenues
thereby wiping out any operating budget deficits
and any need for service cuts. In fact, like BART, AC
Transit service could expand services.
iii.

MTC's Total Allocation of
Subsidies-Operatingand
Capital-hasa DisparateImpact
on Minorities

The third option for presenting a prima facie
case of disparate impact, that MTC's total allocation
of subsidies-operating and capital-has a disparate impact on minorities, is the best option.
Combining operating and capital subsidies demonstrates the true extent to which the systems are disproportionately funded. Moreover, a comparison of
total allocation of subsidies comports with an
underlying principle of the Second Circuit's instructions in New York Urban League and the approach of
the plaintiffs in Los Angeles County MTA.
In New York Urban League, the Second Circuit
instructed the lower court not to focus on the narrow farebox recovery ratio, which only assesses
211. See discussion supra Part IIIA.3.
212. New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1037.
213. See discussion supra Part III.B.
214. We limited this analysis to the constrained capital program plans because BARTs operating financial forecasts are
based on its Track One (constrained) capital program plans. See
BART, 1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 3. at 4. Moreover, the con-

operating efficiency. 211 Although New York Urban
League only concerned operating budgets, a principle underlying the Court's opinion is that a court
ought to consider the complete subsidization of the
systems. According to the Second Circuit, since the
underlying claim challenged the total allocation of subsidies, the lower court should have "assessed
whether any measure or combination of measures
could adequately capture the impact of these subsidies upon NYCTA and commuter line passengers."212 In Los Angeles County MTA , the plaintiffs
alleged that the disproportionate allocation of
operating and capital funds was discriminatory, and
213
they were able to forge a powerful settlement.
Following a broad reading of the Second Circuit's
language and the successful strategy in Los Angeles
County MTA, AC Transit riders should challenge the
total allocation of subsidies--operating and capital-to AC Transit and BART.
Combining the subsidies is a factually complicated task. First, capital subsidies spent in any one
year are actually consumed by users over many
years. Therefore, capital subsidies should be annualized over time. Second, capital subsidies vary
from year to year due to the realities of investment
and construction. Thus, the total capital subsidies
should be annualized over a term of years in order
to reflect accurately the yearly costs. After the annualized capital subsidies have been calculated, they
may be added to an annualized operating subsidy in
order determine the total annual subsidization of a
transit system. The subsidization per passenger
may be derived by dividing the total annual subsidization of each system by the projected number of
passengers per year.
In devising a methodology for calculating the
total subsidization per passenger of BART and AC
Transit, I worked with Thomas A. Rubin, CPA, a mass
transit financial planning expert. First, we calculated total subsidization over ten years for the two systems based on BART's and AC Transit's constrained
capital program plans. 214 Over ten years, from FY
1996/97 to FY 2005/06, BART's Track One plan's total
costs are listed as $3.710 billion. 215 To annualize
these costs, we used an adaptation of the U.S.
Federal Transit Administration's methodology for
proposed "new start" projects. 216 This methodology
strained scenarios seem more realistic than the unconstrained
scenarios.
215. See BART,1996 CIP,supra note 100, ch. I,at 7.
216. See Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Transp., A Detailed Description of UMTs System for

Rating Proposed Major Transit Investments 9-12 (1984). The former name for the U.S. Transit Administration is the Urban Mass
Transportation Administration ("UMTA").
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for annualizing capital costs offers standardized
useful lives for categories of capital expenditures,
such as 30 years for buildings, 25 years for trains,
and 12 years for buses. 217 In annualizing the capital
costs for the various expenditures, we used a dis218
count rate of 7%, as is currently used by the FTA.

One difficulty in annualizing BARTs Track One
(constrained) capital costs was that BART's 1996
Capital Improvement Program's Summary of
Funding Needs by Funding Availability Status chart
breaks the costs into general categories such as
"Phase I Extensions Program" which lumps together
projects with different useful lives. 21 9 However, the
Capital Improvement's Summary of Funding Needs
by Program Area chart-which, unfortunately, does
not delineate Track One from Track Two costsbreaks the costs into categories which comport with
the useful life categories. 220 Data from the Summary
of Funding Needs by Availability Status chart were
used to eliminate costs from the Summary of
Funding Needs by Program Area chart that are not
Track One costs. 22' For capital costs such as

"Extensions," where it was not possible to break the
expenditures into individual component parts due
to lack of data, 222 a composite useful life was estimated. 223 The analysis shows that BART's ten year
Track One $3.710 billion capital expenditure plan is
224
the equivalent of a $301.2 million annual cost.

217. See Urban Mass Transportation Administration, U.S.
Dep't of Transp., Section 9 Formula Grant Application
Instructions, § IV,at 3-6 (1987).
218. See Letter from Charlotte M. Adams, Associate
Administrator for Planning, Federal Transit Administration, to
FTA Colleague (Oct. 6, 1995) (on file with Hastings WestNorhwest
Journalof Environmental Law and Policy).
219. See BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100. ch. I. at 7.
220. See id.ch. 1,at 6.
221. See id.ch. I. at 6-7. In most cases, this was a simple
matter of elimination of costs of program elements that were not
listed as Track Two costs on the Summary of Funding Needs by
Availability Status chart. To handle the "Systemwide Renovation"
costs, however, a different methodology was necessary because
this chart does not cleanly divide the costs between Tracks One
and Two. The procedure was to calculate the total Track One
System Renovation costs by adding Priority I and 2 System
Renovation Costs. Then, the total Track One System Renovation
Costs were divided by the total Track Two System Renovation
Costs, producing a factor of approximately 89.5%. This factor was
then applied to each Systemwide Renovation cost listed in the
Summary of Funding Needs by Program Area chart in order to
estimate the percentage of costs attributable to each project category which are likely to be Track One costs. While this is
undoubtedly not 100% accurate, the maximum range of error is
insignificant for the instant purposes. See Appendix A.
222. See BART, 1996 CIP, supra note 100, ch. I, at 6.
223. An attempt was made to overestimate the composite
useful lives, which produces lower annualized costs, in order to
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As to BARTs annual operating costs, for FY
2005/06, BART projects its total operating expenses
at $410.0 million.225 Subtracting projected net passenger revenue of $210.7 million 226 leaves a total
projected operating subsidy of $199.3 million for FY
2005/06.227 Together, the total subsidy-operating
and capital-adds up to $500.5 million. 228 Dividing
by the projected number of passenger trips for FY
2005/06 (100.6 million) 229 results in a total subsidy
0
per passenger of $4.98.23
Over ten years, from FY 1996/97 to FY 2005/06,
AC Transit's constrained capital expenditure plan
calls for spending $268.9 million. 23 1 Using the
methodology applied to BART's Track One capital
plans results in an annualized capital cost of $29.6
million. 232 As to operating expenses, AC Transit's
1995 SRTP only projects to FY 2004/05. In that year,
AC Transit projects its operating expenses to be
$219.5 million. 233 Adjusted by a conservative 2.5%
inflation factor, we project AC Transit's FY 2005/06
operating expenses to be $225.0 million. 234 We project operating revenues-which includes fare revenues, BART transfers and other non-farebox
235
sources of funding-will reach $70.0 million.
Subtracting the operating revenues and the
tire/tube replacement program from the $225.0 million in projected expenses results in a total operat236
ing subsidy for FY 2005/06 of $156.7 million.
avoid overestimating that actual annualized costs. For example,
30 years was used as the composite useful life for "Extensions."
See Appendix A.
224. See id.
225. See BART, 1996 SRTP,supra note 97, ch. 4. at 10, fig. 4-2.
226. See id.
227. See Appendix A.
228. See id.
229. See BART, 1996 SRTPR supra note 97, ch. 3, at 7.
230. See Appendix A.
231. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 121 tbl. 4-8.
232. See Appendix B.AC Transit lists tires and tubes as a
capital expenditure, ostensibly so that the agency may apply for
federal capital grants. See also AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note
90, at 121, tbl. 4-8. To reflect the fact that tires and tubes are
more accurately categorized as operating expenses, the ten year
total expenditures were included in operating expenses, with
the ten year cost divided by ten to produce the cost for FY
2005/06.
233. See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 148, tbl.
5-7.
234. See Appendix B.
235. $70.0 million is approximately 31% of the projected
$225.0 million in operating expenses. See Letter from Thomas A.
Rubin, CPA, to Kevin Siegel, supra note 70, at 9.
236. See Appendix B.
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Together, the total subsidy--operating and capital-adds up to $186.3 million. 237 Assuming, conservatively, that AC Transit will enjoy no growth in
passenger trips, dividing the total annual subsidy of
$186.3 million by the number of passenger trips for
FY 1995/96 (64.0 million) 238 results in a total subsidy
per passenger of $2.91.239
AC Transit riders could present a strong prima
facie case by comparing the total subsidy per passenger figures. Comparing the data shows that,
under the constrained scenarios, BART's subsidy
per passenger by FY 2005/06 will be approximately
71% more per passenger than AC Transit's ($4.98 v.
$2.91 per passenger). Each passenger on the
respective systems is presumably using public
transportation for essential tasks, such as getting to
work or shopping for groceries. It is inequitable for
the government to pay more for the costs of these
trips for white riders. Of course, BART riders are
travelling greater distances to complete these
essential tasks, but it does not follow that MTC
should fund the expansion of a system which
encourages whites to live further from work and the
grocery store while cutting inner-city bus service. In
essence, the effect of the 71% funding disparity is
that Bay Area transportation agencies are saying we
value the demographic realities and life choices of
whites more than those of non-whites.
Moreover, the disproportionate funding has an
especially harsh impact on AC Transit riders who, as
a class, are more dependent on public transportation than BART riders. Indeed, AC transit has
acknowledged that "a large portion of AC Transit's
240
customers have few transportation alternatives."
Supporting the transit dependency claim is the fact
that, despite the service cuts, AC Transit ridership
increased in FY 1995/96.241 Thus, AC Transit riders
could make a strong argument that the disparate
impact of the funding disparity is especially pronounced given their lack of alternatives.
Admittedly, the 71% disparity is based on projections through 2005/06, and a court would likely
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See id.
See AC TRANsIT. 1996 ANN. REP.,
supra note 106. at 45.
See Appendix B.
See AC TRANSIT, 1995 SRTP, supra note 90, at 36.
See AC TRANSIT. 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at 45.

242. See Federal Transit Authority, Revised Measures for
Assessing Major Investments: A Discussion Draft, (September
1994) <http://www.fta.dot.gov/library/policy/draftjcRA-text.htm>.
The authority to consider these factors is found in the Federal
Transit Act §3(i), 49 U.S.C. § 5309e (1996), and Executive Order
12893. 30 Weekly Comp.Pres. Doc. 160.
243. For example, the Dublin/Pleasanton extension's total
cost was $517 million. See Bowman, Not Everyone IsOn Board With

,Nme

rule that the issue if so presented is not ripe.
However, a plaintiff could present the disproportionate subsidization for any one year and use the
projected disparity to illustrate how that year is not
an anomaly. In addition, AC Transit riders could use
the projected disparity to educate the decision makers and pressure them to address the inequity. This
education and pressure would be vital to prevent
BART from realizing its unconstrained capital
improvement program while AC Transit remained
mired in its constrained program.
b. Funding the East Bay Extensions
has a Disparate Impact on
Minorities

AC Transit riders could focus on the subsidization of BART extensions, particularly the East Bay
extensions, as compared to AC Transit's capital projects. This analysis would concentrate on demonstrating that the capital subsidy per new rider on
the BART extensions is astronomical as compared
to the capital subsidy per AC Transit rider. This theory may be supported by Federal Transit
Administration's practice of evaluating cost per new
transit trip as well as potential mobility improvements, environmental benefits and operating efficiencies when deciding whether to subsidize a new
start.242 More data is needed before these calculations can be made accurately. However, a few figures are worth noting.
The Track One East Bay extensions cost in the
range of $500 million each. 243 The East Bay extensions are opening in cities with majority white populations. 244 Meanwhile, the number of new riders
the extensions are adding is open to debate. In May,
1996,
BART
claimed
that
the
North
Concord/Martinez station added 3200 weekday passengers. 245 However, the figure may be inflated
more than three times.246 AC Transit riders could
research the actual change in ridership and the total
costs of the other Track One East Bay Extensions 247
and calculate the capital costs per new rider.
BART's Dublin Extension, supra note 186, at Al. The Pittsburg/Bay
Point extension's cost was $506 million. See BART, 1996 CIP,supra

note 100, ch. 3.at 10.
244. For example, Pittsburg is 61% white and Dublin is 86%

white. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
245. See Nolte, Bay Area Spending More, But Commute Worsens,
supra note 190, at A6.
246. University of California Professor Emeritus Wolf
Homburger, a transportation expert, contended that only 1000 of

the claimed 3200 riders at the station were new riders. He
claimed that the other 2000 switched from another station for the
easier parking. See id.
247. North Concord/Martinez and Castro valley. See BART,
1996 SRTP, supra note 97, ch. 3, at 7.
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Considering that each extension costs hundreds of
millions of dollars, it seems likely that the cost per
new rider will tower over any comparable costs for
AC Transit.
AC Transit riders should note that BART may
not be funding the East Bay extensions with federal

more than six times less. AC Transit riders could
argue that since their services are being cut, providing mostly white BART riders with six times more in
AB 1107 funds has the effect of discriminating
against the mostly minority AC Transit riders.

funds.2 4 8 Perhaps BART did not receive federal cap-

2. Defendant's Burden
IfAC Transit riders meet the burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden would shift to the potential defendants to
prove the subsidy decisions are supported by legitimate business necessities. The potential defendants-MTC, BART, BAAQMD and the State of
California-would surely have an arsenal of arguments that the subsidy decisions are supported by
legitimate business necessities.

ital subsidies here, such as FTA section 3 funds,
because the projects are too inefficient to be eligible. Thus, these inefficient projects utilize state and
local funds, over $500 million per extension. If no
federal funds have been used, East Dublin/Pleasanton and Pittsburg/Bay Point alone would have removed over one billion dollars from the state and
local transit subsidy pools from which AC Transit
seeks to subsidize its operating and capital projects. Perhaps AC Transit has projects which are as
efficient or more efficient than BARTs, but which
have been unable to secure funding- because of
diminished state and local subsidy pools.
c.

Challenging Particular Funding

Streams
i. AB 434
AB 434 funds are capital subsidies derived from
a state authorized surcharge on vehicle registration
fees. 249 A regional state agency, BAAOMD, has dis250
cretion on how to spend 60% of the revenues. AC
Transit riders could investigate BAAOMD's criteria
and method of allocating subsidies to discover
whether BART projects are selected over AC Transit
projects in a manner that discriminates against AC
Transit's largely minority riders, particularly where
BART service would overlap with AC Transit service.
If that is the case, BART may be siphoning riders
from AC Transit, thereby reducing AC Transit's operating revenues, leading to larger operating deficits
and towards new rounds of service cuts.

a.

Countering AC Transit Riders'
Subsidy Per Passenger
Comparisons
The potential defendants would surely argue
that a per passenger subsidy comparison is misleading since the average BART trip covers a much
greater distance than the average AC Transit trip.
They might point out, for example, that BART's cost
per passenger mile for FY 1993/94 was only about
$0.23256

trips.
ii. AB 1107
AB 1107 funds are operating subsidies derived
from a 1/2 cent sales tax imposed in three BART
counties.2 51 Under the state law, MTC must allocate
75% of the revenues to BART.252 AC Transit splits the

remaining 25% with MUNI.2 53 Thus, in FY 1995/96,

BART received $126.1 million in AB 1107 funds 254

while AC Transit received only $19.7 million,2 55

while AC Transit's was about $0.62.257 AC

Transit riders could counter with arguments why a
per passenger comparison is better, as discussed
supra Part IV.C. 1.a.iii.
MTC and BART might point to other performance statistics to argue that AC Transit's operations are inefficient; a problem which increasing
operating subsidies would exacerbate. For example,
AC Transit's farebox recovery ratio is approximately
25% while BART's is about 50%.258 Additionally,
BART receives only about 9% more in operating
subsidies while providing 12% more passenger
259

Therefore, MTC and BART could argue they

have a legitimate business necessity to support the
current level of operating subsidies allocations.
To counter the claim of legitimate business
necessity, AC Transit riders could argue that the
Second Circuit was correct to require a more thorough analysis of the subsidy allocations than performance measures such as the farebox recovery
ratio. A narrow reading of the Second Circuit opin-

248. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.ii.

254. See BART, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 161, at 7. 11.

249. See discussion supra Part l.B.l.b.ii.

255. See AC TRNsr, 1996 ANN. REP., supra note 106, at vii.

250. See id.

256. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.

251. See discussion supra Part lV.B. I.b.i.

257. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
258. See discussion supra Parts IV.BI .c and 2.c.
259. See discussion supra Part IV.c.I .a.i.

252. See id.
253. See id.
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ion would be that courts should only consider funding associated with operating expenses. For example, the Second Circuit noted that the farebox
recovery ratio "does not reveal the extent to which
one system might have higher costs associated with
its operations ....- 260 However, "operations" need not
mean only "operating expenses," and the underlying
principle is that courts should consider the full
range of expenses when determining the appropriate measure or combination of measures for examining the alleged disparate impact. Moreover, this is
the approach by the plaintiffs in Los Angeles County
MTA who won a preliminary injunction and negoti261
ated a favorable settlement.
Thus, AC Transit riders should argue that focusing on performance statistics such as the farebox
recovery ratio does not accurately measure performance. AC Transit riders could promote the combined subsidy allocation measures discussed supra
Part IV.C.l.a.iii or at least encourage the court to
consider both operating and capital subsidies in
some manner to arrive at a better understanding of
the true subsidization of each system.
b. Countering AC Transit Riders' AB
262
434 and AB 1107 Contentions
To the extent that AB 434 and AB 1107 direct MTC
to allocate subsidies in particular percentages to each
agency, the potential defendants may argue the constraints create a legitimate business necessity to support the current allocation. This argument should fail.
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, federal laws such
as Title VI preempt conflicting state laws if Congress
263
intended such state laws to be preempted.
In preemption analysis, the "sole task is to
ascertain the intent of Congress." 264 Federal law
may preempt in three ways: (1) when federal law
expressly preempts state law; (2) where the federal
law completely occupies the field so that there is no
room for state regulation; and (3) where state law
directly conflicts with federal law. 265 The third cate-

gory applies here. To the degree to which AB 434
and AB 1107 cause a disparate impact on racial
minorities, they conflict with the Title VI's purpose.
Recent case law supports the proposition that
260. New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1038 (emphasis
added).

Title VI may preempt conflicting state laws. In a Title
VII case, the Supreme Court specifically held that
defendants do not meet the business necessity burden of proof simply because their practices are
mandated by a state statute. 266 In Association of
Mexican-American Educators v. California, the District
Court for the Northern District of California held
that minority teacher candidates may sue under
Title VI to challenge the California Basic
Educational Skills Test ("CBEST"), a teacher certifi267
cation examination established under state law.
In Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, the
highest state court of New York held that a Title VI
suit challenging New York's statutory formula for
268
funding school districts may proceed.
The Ninth Circuit, in a Title VII case vacated as
moot by the Supreme Court, has summarized the
connection between state law and business necessity as follows:
ITIhe adoption of a constitutional provision or a statute does not ipso facto create
a business necessity. [Citing Dothard v.
Rawlinson.l A state enactment cannot constitute the business justification for the
adoption of a discriminatory rule unless
the state measure itself meets the business
necessity test; otherwise employers could
justify discriminatory regulations by relying
on state laws that encourage or require discriminatory conduct. Id. For federal law
purposes, it is immaterial whether inadequate justifications directly underlie the
actions of a government agency or are
incorporated in the constitution of a state.
In either case, if the proffered justifications
fail to meet the business necessity test,
269
they are legally insufficient.
c.

Significant but Difficult-toQuantify Costs and Benefits
The potential defendants may also seize on the
defendants' argument in New York Urban League that
heavy subsidization of BART provides "significant but
difficult-to-quantify" benefits for AC Transit riders,
264. See id.

265. See id.at 280-81.

261. See Los Angeles County MTA (C.D. Cal. 1996) (No.
CV94-5936). See also discussion supra Part IV.B.

266. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14
(1977).

262. For much of the following preemption analysis, I am
indebted to New York City Environmental justice Alliance's Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees, New York Urban
League, 71 F.3d 1031.

267. See Association of Mexican-American Educators v.
California, 836 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D.Cal. 1993).

263. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 280 (1987).

268. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86
N.Y.2d 307 (1995).
269. Gutierrez v. Municpal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated. 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
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such as reduced congestion and pollution.27 0 The
potential plaintiffs should point out that the Second
Circuit noted but did endorse the argument.2 71AC
Transit riders should argue that factoring in such benefits is impossible and distracts from the Title VI violation. In the alternative, at least as far as the extensions
are concerned, the potential plaintiffs could argue that
the benefits are de minimis since the number of riders
added by the extensions is too small to have a significant impact on congestion, pollution, etc.
3. Less DiscriminatoryAlternatives
If a court were to find the defendants did not
demonstrate a legitimate business justification,
this analysis would be unnecessary. However, if a
court were to find that the defendants met the burden of proof, the burden would shift back to the
plaintiffs to demonstrate less discriminatory alternatives.2 72 The following discussion is rather brief as
the thrust of this note is to provide AC Transit riders
with analysis which would aid them in establishing
a prima facie case.
The potential plaintiffs should be able to meet
this burden. The center of their argument here could
be that the total subsidization of the two systems
should be more balanced. The simplest and arguably
the best alternative would be to require the total
subsidies per passenger for BART and AC Transit to
be equal or at least more balanced on a per passenger basis. Over ten years and under the constrained
scenarios, BART riders are projected to enjoy 71%
more in funding. 273 This ought to be corrected.
These statistics show there is a huge disparity
in funding the systems and that subsidizing AC
Transit at least enough so it would not have to cut
services would reduce some discriminatory effects.
AC Transit riders should argue that AC Transit's
total funding per passenger should be increased so
that it could expand and improve its system to
reach other neighborhoods as BART has been able
to do. Alternatively, the plaintiffs should argue that
BART should be extended into minority communities in the East Bay, not just the mostly white communities it has selected.
270. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a.

271. See id.

272. See discussion supra Part II.B.
273. See discussion supra Part IV.C.I.a.iii.
274. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see
also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court instructed
lower courts testing for intentional discrimination to consider:
"Ill the impact of the official action whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another,' [citing Washington v. Davis] .... 121
The historical background of the decision ...

particularly if it

D. Other Theories
Title VI is not the sole cause of action by which
AC Transit riders could challenge the disproportionate funding of BART over AC Transit. For example,
AC Transit riders could pursue a 14th Amendment
claim. This would present a much more difficult
case as the plaintiffs would be required to show dis274
criminatory intent on the part of the defendants.
In addition, AC Transit riders could press the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation to
find that MTC and BART are violating 49 U.S.C. section 5332. Under section 5332, "lal person may not
be excluded from participating in, denied a benefit
of, or discriminated against under, a project, program or activity receiving financial assistance under
this chapter because of race, color, creed, national
origin, sex or age."275 If the Secretary makes a find-

ing of noncompliance, he must cut off federal financial assistance under this chapter (49 U.S.C. section
5301 et seq.), refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney
General with a recommendation that a civil action
be brought, proceed himself under Title VI, and take
other action as provided by law. 27 6 Clearly, the hur-

dle for AC Transit riders under section 5332 would
be to persuade the Secretary that BART and MTC
were not complying with the section.
V. Conclusion
The basic facts are simple. Mass transit systems
serving mostly white riderships are disproportionately funded over systems serving mostly minority
riderships. The effect is to discriminate against
racial minorities. In the Bay Area, the MTC is allocating subsidies to BART to assist the commuter
rail district in its expansion to mostly white suburbs. Meanwhile, AC Transit's mostly minority riders
are suffering through service cutbacks.
The interpretation of the facts is complicated.
An analysis of the planned operating and capital
subsidization of the systems over the next ten years
reveals that, on a per passenger basis, BART riders
are projected enjoy a 71% greater total subsidy than
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes...
. 131 The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision .... 141 The legislative or administrative history..
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67.
275. 49 U.S.C. § 5332b (1996). The statute's definition of
"person" includes a governmental authority. 49 U.S.C.§ 5332a
(1996). Note that section 5332 prohibits discriminating against a
person based on sex and age. It may be worth investigating if
there is a significant discrepancy between AC Transit and BART
riders with respect to these characteristics.
276. 49 U.S.C.§ 5332d (1996).
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AC Transit riders. Moreover, BARTs expansion is
extraordinarily expensive, and the cost per new
rider may dwarf any comparable costs for AC Transit
riders. The effect of the disproportionate funding of
the two systems is racial discrimination in Bay Area
mass transit services.
AC Transit riders could file suit against MTC,
BART and other potential defendants under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. U.S. DOT regulations
prohibit any entity which receives federal financial
assistance from utilizing criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of discriminating against racial minorities. AC Transit riders could
make a strong prima facia case by pointing to the
substantial per passenger disparity in total funding
based on the ten year projections, the figures for
any year for which the budgets have been allocated,
or a more narrow attack on the huge BART extension subsidies. However, MTC, BART and other
potential defendants would have a number of
strong counter-arguments-including arguments
that a cost per passenger mile is a more accurate
performance statistic comparison, that AC Transit's
operating inefficiencies are the source of the prob-

Volume 4,Number I
lem rather than subsidization disparities, and that
there are other significant but difficult-to-quantify
benefits for the current allocation of funds-and
might very well be able to establish legitimate business necessities for the per passenger disparity. If
the case proceeded so far, AC Transit riders would
have the final burden of offering alternatives for
equitably funding the systems, such as equitably
subsidizing the systems on a per passenger basis.
A Title VI trial would be lengthy and expensive.
Even if the plaintiffs won at trial, the defendants
would likely appeal, dragging the case on while AC
Transit riders waited for an end to the disparity.
Moreover, financial analysis is an interpretative art,
and AC Transit riders would face many obstacles in
proving their case. Yet, at bottom, BART riders are
getting more financial support than AC Transit riders, and the respective expansion and contraction
of the two systems is all to clear to those whose bus
lines have been cut. In short, while AC Transit riders
may have difficulties proving a Title VI case in court,
they would have a lot of evidence with which to convince MTC and BART to settle the suit and fairly
fund AC Transit.
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Appendix A-BART/AC TRANSIT COSTS AND SUBSIDIES/PASSENGER
('000's)
FY97-06
Cost

Description

Useful
Life

('000's)
Annualized
Cost

BART-Track I (Constrained)
SYSTEMWIDE RENOVATION:
Rolling Stock
Mainline, Stations, & Shops & Yards
Controls & Communications & Work Equipment

$433,966
413,730
196,524

$37,239
33,341
15,837

EXTENSIONS:
Track One Extensions
Oakland Airport Connection
W.Dublin/Pleasanton Station
Pittsburg-Bay Point to Railroad Avenue

2,581,690
0
0
0

Subtotal Extensions

2,581,690

208,049

SEISMIC RETROFIT

0

0

SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS

20,442

1,647

OTHER CAPITAL OBLIGATIONS

63,280

5,100

$3,709,632

301,213

Totals
Operating Cost (FY06)
Less: Operating Revenue (FY06)

410,000
(210,700)

Operating Subsidy (FY06)

199,300

Total Annualized Subsidy (FY06)
Divided By: Unlinked Passenger Trips

500,513
100,600

Subsidy Per Passenger (FY06)

$4.98

Total Annualized Cost
Divided By: Unlinked Passenger Trips
Cost Per Passenger (FY06)

711,213
100,600
$7.07

Systemwlde Renovation Adjustment Factor
Track One/Priority I Costs
Track One/Priority 2 Costs

$824,825
219,395

Total Track One Costs
Total Track One/Iwo Costs

1,044,220
1,167,375

Percentage

89.5%
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Appendix B-AC TRANSIT COSTS AND SUBSIDIES/PASSENGER
('000's)
FY97-06
Cost

Description

('000's)

Annualized
Cost

Useful
Life

AC TRANSIT - Constrained
Buses & Clean Fuel Project
Facilities (Equipment Upgrade)
Non-Revenue Vehicles
Transit Centers
Electric Trolley
ADA PA Announcement
Data Processing Upgrade
Replace Radio Communications System
Facilities Equipment

$171,017
17,598
3,153
7,289
42,623
2,070
4,665
3,078
0

$21,531
1,418
931
625
3,658
295
664
438
0

Total Capital (Less Tires & Tubes)

$251,493

29,561

Operating Cost (FY06)
Less: Operating Revenue (FY06)
Tire/Tubes Replacement Program

225,000

(70,000)
17,441

10

1,744

Operating Subsidy (FY06)

156,744

Total Annualized Subsidy (FY06)
Divided By: Unlinked Passenger Trips

186,305
64,000

Subsidy Per Passenger (FY06)
Total Annualized Cost
Divided By: Unlinked Passenger Trips
Cost Per Passenger (FY06)

$2.91
254,561
64,000

$3.98

